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ABSTRACT 
This paper describes two irrigation systems in Nepal that have undergone 
rehabilitation - Sirsia-Dudhaura and Bangeri. The experience of farmer-irrigators 
and their interaction with authorities of the Department of Irrigation is compared 
and analyzed according to criteria drawn from the literature of common property 
resource and collective goods theory. The analysis specifies organizational 
attributes hypothesized to make for successful and sustainable irrigation system 
rehabilitation, compares the two cases with regard to them, and notes 
implications. Bangeri is found to have much greater success with its 
rehabilitation than Sursia-Dudhaura, and the Bangeri irrigation community also 
possesses the organizational attributes advanced as important to effective local 
organization whereas Sursia-Dudhaura does not. The operation oflocal 
organizations are a most critical part of any canal rehabilitation. 
INTRODUCTION 
What kind of local organizations effectively mobilize local people--their 
knowledge, material resources, and loyalty--and empower them to sponsor and 
sustain rehabilitated irrigation works as partners with central state irrigation 
bureaucracies? What kind of organizations provide vehicles for meaningful 
participation in irrigation development, and also constitute viable links between 
central government ministries and local social-ecological niches in the 
countryside? What attributes do effective local irrigation organizations have that 
distinguish them from organizations which can be expected to fail in these 
respects? 
It is the purpose of this paper to address these questions employing lessons 
learned from the study oflocal irrigation organizations (Freeman, 1989); most 
specifically, the ideas will be illustrated by materials drawn from a comparison of 
'Professor, Department of Sociology, Colorado State University, Fort 
Collins, CO 80523 
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two irrigation systems in Nepal'. 
THEORY 
Importance ofl.ocal Organization 
A tradition ofinquiry has emerged (Bromley, 1992; Cemea, 1985; Freeman, 1989; 
Korten and Alfonso, 1983; Lam, 1998; Montgomery, 1974; Ostrom, 1990; 
Ostrom, Gardener, and Walker, 1994; and Tang, 1992), representatives of which 
have contended that local quasi-public non-governmental organizations are 
essential to any vision of productive, equitable, socially and ecologically 
sustainable democratic development This is so because properly-designed and 
managed local organizations: 
1. Are uniquely able to administer centrally supplied resources (e.g., money, 
canal water, etc.) to specific needs in particular socia-ecological niches. 
2. Unite the general knowledge of central tendencies across large 
administrative units, commanded by occupants of central ministries, with the local 
knowledge of site-specific particulars that associates with local citizens. 
3. Provide a form of social organization that insures that, in some "fair share" 
way, all prospective beneficiaries contribute to provide the collective good or 
common property resource, that each contribution be matched by a "fair share" 
contribution from each other member, and that, in return, members in good 
standing receive a "fair share" portion of the benefit stream(s). Attributes of 
public goods and common property resources have been discussed in a well 
developed literature (Olson, 1965; Mueller, 1979; Frohock, 1989; Ostrom, 1990: 
29-5Sl Social organizations defeat "free riding" and make possible the provision 
2This paper draws heavily for its case material from my report to His 
Majesties' Government of Nepal (Freeman, 1992). 
7he terms, "collective good" and "common property resource" represent 
closely related, but distinguishable, concepts. Whereas a private good produces 
benefits which can be captured by the investor-owner, a public or collective good 
is one which an investor cannot capture any greater share of the benefit than can a 
non-investor (non-excludability), and consumption of some portion of the benefit 
does not reduce the portion available for another party (non-rivalness of 
consumption). Examples would include street-lighting, flood control projects, 
national defense, smoke abatement in an airshed. A common property resource is 
taken to be one in which the criterion of excludability is fulfilled for some easily 
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and operation of a canal network. 
4. Provide viable arenas for meaningful citizen democratic participation. 
Citizens practice democracy as members, leaders, and employees of appropriately 
designed local organizations, implementing public and quasi-public organizational 
business in ways responsive to agendas of state ministries and local citizen-
members. 
To examine the argument more closely, the discussion now turns to the world of 
irrigated agriculture. 
Organizing For Water Control 
Irrigation water, to be productive, must be controlled. It must arrive at the crop 
root-zone in the proper amount and at the required time to fulfill crop 
consumptive needs and soil leaching requirements. Water coming too soon, too 
late, too much, or too little relative to crop and soil requirements is oflow, or even 
negative, value. Irrigation water control, in tum, is dependent upon the quality of 
irrigation organization (Freeman, 1989). If water gets to the plant root zone at the 
proper time, and in the proper amount, it is because people have organized 
collectively to perform tasks beyond the capacity of individuals, and beyond the 
scope of private consumer markets. Individuals can enter marketplaces to buy 
private goods such as seeds, fertilizers, and farm implements, but no farmer 
anywhere in the world can order up a quantity of water control in the local shop, 
place it in a cart, and take it back to the farm. Water control is provided only by 
effective farmer organization linked to upstream central supply bureaucracies and 
downstream member irrigators who represent water demand. 
Characteristics of Effective Local Water Organizations 
What are the characteristics which define effective local water user organizations 
(WUO's) which make it possible for citizen-members to democratically and 
equitably provide water control for agricultural productivity? Researchers have 
been investigating the question of what constitutes WUO effectiveness in many 
cultures for years, and debates about issues continue (cf. Maass and Anderson, 
1986; Freeman, 1989; Lam, 1998; Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Schroeder, and Wynne, 
1993, Tang, 1992). On the basis ofliterature review and empirical field research 
defined "outsiders" but is not fulfilled for "insiders" in a resource consuming 
community. Furthermore, there is considerable rivalness of consumption-i.e., 
water applied to the field offarmer X, is not available to farmer Y. Yet, in 
common property resources there must be joint action to provide, and divide, the 
resource if the resource stream is to be sustained (See Ostrom, 1990; 30-33). 
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(Freeman, 1989: 24-59), I assert that a few variables are strategic--i.e., small 
changes in them may have large consequences in effectiveness of local 
organization. The strategic variables and their relationships are depicted in Figure 
1 and are synthesized as follows: 
/ 
Figure 1. Strategic Variables in Organizational Analysis 
1. What kind of people will lead the local WUO by virtue of their 
election/appointment to membership on the governing board, council, or irrigation 
committee, and what kind of people must be hired by that representative body of 
the irrigators to do the daily staff work of the organization? The answer is clear 
'and has two aspects: 
a. It is important (Freeman, 1989:26-27) that members of the local 
organizational board be local citizen-irrigators who are elected in democratic ways 
representing various reaches of the local canal system. The rejected option is to 
fill leadership and staff positions with "cosmopolitans" who are employed on 
national or 'regional labor markets far exceeding the scope of the local community, 
placed on the payrolls of central ministries, and who are appointed by higher 
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authority to the local organization for specified periods of time--usually in two or 
four year rotations. 
b. Leaders and staff must be fully accountable to the local 
organization member-irrigators as distinguished from looking upward to the 
central bureaucracy for definitions of success and failure. This is so because 
central bureaucracy staff, however well trained in various disciplines relevant to 
irrigation and however well intentioned, will virtually never develop: I) the 
required site-specific local knowledge to operate the share system effectively; 2) 
the local social capital necessary to deal with the innumerable local conflicts and 
problems that must be dealt with by irrigators who spend their lifetime in the local 
community. The educated cosmopolitan outsider who serves in district, 
provincial, or national offices has an important role to play, but that role is not on 
the irrigation committee or staff of the local WUO. WUO's must provide a 
protected social space where farmers in possession of detailed local knowledge 
can administer their water share distributional systems, knowing they will bear the 
consequences of their decisions in terms of both cost and benefit. 
2. At the very heart of any effective W A is a functioning water share 
distribution system (Freeman, 1989:27-33) (See Figures 1 and 2). For farmers in 
successful water cultures around the world, the idea of a water share 
organizational agreement is two sided: a share confers upon each member of the 
irrigation community a legitimate access to water within the arranged rules and 
tools; and it confers an obligation to contribute an agreed upon "fair share" of the 
costs of managing water in the system. The concept of a water share distribution 
system unites two essential aspects of organizational operations - resource 
I. Distributional Shares Involve: 
A. A right to a proportion of benefit - e.g. water 
B. An assessment obligation to pay costs of organizationaf 











III. Members vote their shares in conduct of organizatiOnal business. 
A. Member X - owns 9 shares out of 100; votes 9 shares. 
B. Member Y - owns 7 shares out of 100; votes 7 shares. 
Figure 2. Concept of Distributional Share 
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acquisition for operations and maintenance and water allocation along the canals; 
and delivery of a stream of organizational benefits such as water under control. 
The specifics of water share arrangements may vary considerably from locale to 
locale (Freeman, 1989: 27-28), but three considerations are always important in 
successful WUO's: 
a. Does getting the water service to the field depend directly upon the 
irrigator paying his/her share of the local system management cost, or is water 
delivery divorced from fulfillment of the irrigator's cost obligations? Where 
payment and dividend are tightly connected, it is possible for farmers to 
successfully organize. Where payment and delivery of the benefit are divorced, 
farmers will not pay, local resources will not be mobilized, management will 
suffer, and water control will be diminished to unacceptable levels for many 
organizational members. 
b. Are water volumes received roughly proportionate to shares of 
system costs paid? This is essential to equity. Farmers will not be willing to give 
loyalty to systems, and be supportive of democratic procedures, where at least 
rough equity is not served--i.e. where members receive benefit streams 
disproportionate to their investment in the organization. 
c. Does the quality and quantity of organizational service depend on 
position in the membership queue? As irrigation water flows from head to tail 
positions, irrigators farther downstream are more wlnerable to water losses due to 
leaks, seepage, evaporation, non-routine breakdowns, and the self interested 
manipUlations of upstream irrigators. Head-tail issues become divisive if the 
share system allows inequitable advantage for head irrigators, since head irrigators 
are uninterested in investing their resources on behalf of those less well located. 
However, it is possible to organize the head-tail distinction out of the irrigation 
conununity by creating an interest conunon to all users. This can be achieved by 
measuring water volume delivered to the field gate. If water is distributed by 
volume, "head" farmers will feel the pinch of poorly perfonning canals (which 
take longer to deliver to the tails) because heads cannot obtain their next delivery 
until tails are served. Thus all farmers become interested in reducing the loss or 
"shrink" of poorly performing canals. By organizing the flow of benefits and 
losses so that all members, regardless of position in the dividend queue, will share 
equally in the system, an organizational life of much higher quality is achieved 
that provides a basis for general membership loyalty and active democratic 
participation. 
3. What do irrigators do when they organize? They collectively organize a 
board or council which employs staff to operate and maintain the water share 
distribution system. Operation and management means exactly this. If members 
do not have a workable share system, they may constitute a pressure group to 
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obtain funds from a higher agency but they cannot be an irrigation organization 
because they then have no appropriate rules and tools for controlling and dividing 
water. What does the irrigation board or council discuss? It discusses the share 
system and how to keep it implemented in day-to-day operations. What is 
maintenance all about? It is about how to do what must be done to keep the shan: 
system operative. Maintenance activity, divorced from a.viable share system, has 
no justification. Maintenance of facilities is hard work, costs money, and is of no 
intrinsic interest to citizen-farmers unless a viable share system assures a payoff--
in this case, water under acceptable control. How about conflict resolution and 
management? Conflicts emerge out of problems with the share system and are 
resolved by getting the share system to work on behalf of the farmers. Conflicts 
among irrigators can only be resolved in terms of rewarding those who support the 
share system, punishing those who violate it (by local leadership/membership 
denying the offender her-his share of the benefit stream), or possibly reforming 
share system defects so that it no longer generates grievances. 
In summary, heart of a water users' organization is its share distribution system, 
and all important organizational activities center upon it. Small changes in the 
water share distributional system have big consequences for irrigation water 
control, productivity, and equity, and willingness to democratically participate. 
When water is effectively controlled through a viable share system, it makes for 
effective organizations which earn the support of members, and in tum makes 
possible participation in a civic democratic community. 
Viewed in this light, one now sees how effective WUO's become the centerpiece 
of disciplined and productive farmer participation, democratization, 
accountability, productivity, and social equity. 
CASES 
The discussion now turns to specific cases of local Water user organizations 
(WUO's) observed in Nepal. The purpose is to take the abstract concepts 
discussed above to the world of Nepali irrigation. One system - the Sirsia-
Dudhaura - has good potential but does not have the organizational attributes 
necessary to make it an effective vehicle for democratic social development. The 
second system - the Bangeri - has been successfully functioning nearby for three 
generations. Observation reveals that the Bangeri has the attributes of a 
successful organization as outlined above. 
Total irrigated area in Nepal is estimated to amount to about 1,000,000 hectares. 
This represents about 38% of the cultivated area of the nation (Rana, 1989: 6). 
The Government of Nepal Department of Irrigation (DOl) accepts responsibility 
for administering roughly 300,000 hec~ of irrigated land in Nepal, of which 
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about 260,000 hectares are in agency assisted joint-managed systems such as 
Sirsia-Dudhaura. Farmer managed systems such as Bangeri amount to about 
700,000 ha. 
Sirsia-Dudhaura - Failure in Organizational Design 
This irrigation system has been the subject of much investigation, policy 
discussion, and USAIDI DOl investment No attempt will be made here to give a 
full physical, agronomic, or organizational description of the system; that has been 
done by others (Laitos, et. aI, 1985). Suffice to say that Sirsia-Dudhaura is one of 
the older government managed systems in Nepal as DOl constructed the original 
headworks, one main and five branch canals with USAID assistance between 
1953 and 1957. A high quality government-installed pucca .headgatej diverts 
water from the Sirsia River to the main canal, then the flow is to two channels at 
Tajpur, and on to three branch canals at a trifurcation structure (See map, Figure 
3). The Sirsia portion of the system was originally designed to command 1,400 
ha. (Laitos, et al., 1985:11) and it came to incorporate an already existing 
f 
Source: ·Laitos, et aI., p. 3 
Figure 3. The Sirsia Irrigation System 
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Dudhaura system irrigating about 650 ha. fed by flows from the Dudhaura River. 
The water allocation system is to rotate water from head to tail ofthe main canal 
and five secondary channels. In the Sirsia portion of the system, groundwater use 
was reported to be insignificant. 
After initial construction, the system rapidly deteriorated and remained in an 
advanced state of deterioration for years. In 1984, an interdisciplinary team funded 
by USAID, working with the DOl and farmers, conducted a diagnostic analysis 
(Laitos, et aI., 1985). A subsequent rehabilitation effort during 1986-88 improved 
the physical works and organized farmers at three levels: a) sub-block units (4-5 
ha.); b) block units (20-50 ha.); and c) at the system level. Farmer infonnants 
expressed satisfaction that the Irrigation Management Project got them involved; 
they reported that farmer involvement in this work was highly valued by many 
farmers. 
During kharif(sununer), crops center on early and late varieties of rice. During 
rabi (winter) season, farmers focus on wheat, potatoes, maize, mustard, and 
oilseeds. Sugarcane grows over the course of both kharif and rabi seasons; given 
the lack of water, larger farmers are reported to plant sugarcane as insurance 
against drought during rabi given that even 10-20% of potential yield promises 
sufficient cash to be worth the investment. Informants reported that so many 
farmers have gone to sugarcane as drought insurance, that local sugarcane mills in 
the area were operating well over 8 months per year even though they were 
designed to operate only about 3 months per year. In an especially good year, a 
farmer can grow early rice, late rice, and rabi wheat. Cropping intensities are 
generally high (reportedly about 250%) but much land is planted in lower value 
drought resistant crops during rabi due to the generally insufficient water supply. 
Farmers and other informants reported that yields diminish as one moves from the 
head to the tails of the system. All of these factors suggest that water control is 
seriously problematic in this irrigation system. 
Administratively, Sirsia-Dudhaura is under the jurisdiction ofthe DOl. The 
District Officer is charged to render technical assistance to privately managed 
systems in the district. to conduct programs of "river training" (erosion and flood 
control), to manage district tube-wells, and to manage irrigation water flows in the 
main and secondary canals of the Sirsia-Dudhaura system. He is assisted by two 
engineers, one of whom is given responsibility for Sirsia-Dudhaura, one Overseer, 
a number ofDhalpas (gatekeepers), and a Chowkidar (headgate watchman), all 
hired by DOl, and paid out of the District Office budget. 
How does the system work? Toli (Block) Committees, supposedly working 
collaboratively with the DOl Engineer, Overseer, and Gatekeepers, decide upon a 
rotation system to allocate water among the five secondary canals that will serve 
crop needs in the system. During kharif, if the rains are good and continuous, 
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there is relatively little stress on the allocation system. However, when monsoon 
rains are sparse and crop consumptive demand great, much demand for water 
comes on the system and there is no other allocation method than just to run water 
in each secondary canal for 4-5 days at a time, then rotate to the next canal or two 
for a similar period. How many secondary canals can be on at once depends on . 
the river flow at the headgate. Most often the 4-5 day flow period in secondary 
canals is not sufficient to satisfy demand in either kharif or rabi. Most often it is 
not. Demand from lower distributaries necessitates a cut-off of water leaving 
middle and tail farmers without water. Later, on the next general rotation, block 
committees will try to start the flow of water to the tertiary canals at the point 
where it had to be stopped many days earlier on the prior rotation. What ifhead 
farmers jump in and take water before it gets to those downstream? It happens. 
Toli committees try to put social pressure on those who abuse up-stream positions 
to extend their turns, but there is no effective share distribution system to insure 
equity. Some farmers, in middle and tail locations who are politically weak, have 
not had water for many seasons and are struggling to improve this situation. 
Technically, farmers are charged for water without regard for volume received or 
the timing of the delivery. In fact, virtually no farmer has paid the irrigation fee 
for at least 5-6 years preceding this author's visit. 
There are many water measurement structures situated at appropriate places in the 
canal network. But there is no clear share system to guide th!lir use; virtually 
nobody takes the trouble to make measurements. After all, why should they? 
Without a sense that a given specific quantity, or proportion, of water flow must 
be delivered to any given point in the canal network, there is little reason to go 
about the business of measurement. Within the memory of the informants neither 
farmer nor official has made an attempt to compute river flow at the headgate staff 
gauge. 
What about farmer relationships with DOl? Farmer informants agreed that the 
most important problem is lack of communication and coordination between 
farmer leaders at the system level and DOl personnel. Farmers spoke frankly, 
clearly, and with good will, but they clearly indicated dissatisfaction with DOl 
management on several counts. 
The agency, in the view of most farmers, grossly mismanages resources. It spends 
far too much money on cars, fuel, badly designed and constructed equipment, and 
"experts" like me. DOl pays Rs 1,050/month to the headgate watchman and built 
him a quality pucca ,)louse at the headgate site. Yet, he is never around. Even if 
he stayed on the site, it is not clear that he could do anything really worth doing. 
It is a small thing to complain about given all the bigger waste, but it irritates 
farmers when they see this kind of fund mismanagement. 
DOl provides nothing of value on a day-to-day Operation and Management 
Organizational Requisites 
(O&M) basis. Anything worth doing is done by the fanners themselves. The DOl 
engineer assigned responsibility for Sirsia-Dudhaura is housed at the Rice 
Research Institute near the headworks, but he does nothing. What can he do? It is 
unclear what his job description is or should be. 
DOl is guilty of lack of "transparency." The govermnent agents expect the 
farmers to keep their records and activities open for review, but they do not let 
farmers review govermnent records and operations. Fanners are insulted by this. 
Control over funds is a source of conflict. There was much that the farmers 
wished to communicate to me about this but I failed to grasp all of the aspects of 
this problem. Much was lost in the translation. Fanners made it clear that they 
think they should have full control of any funds due to them. 
The agency, fanner-informants unanimously reported, has no real respect for 
fanners or fanner leaders. In the informants' view, DOl wants "dummy" leaders 
who will be quiet, compliant, and continue the pretense that things are going 
along in an acceptable fashion. Real leaders speaking honestly about problems 
are not welcome and their election to positions of W A authority are resisted by the 
DOl. Fanners and their leaders are angered by this. One said: "The agency comes 
into our territory and does things to us without our permission. They are like a 
hunter who expects the animal to assist the hunter by helping to steady the gun 
which is pointed at the hunted. II 
Sirsia-Dudhaura - An Analysis 
The Sirsia-Dudhaura system exhibits problems that are found in many irrigation 
systems in other countries. It was designed to be constructed, but was not 
designed to be operated and maintained. Water and money can flow through the 
system if available from sources above the headworks, but it is not a system which 
can do proper irrigation-i.e., it cannot control water to serve consumptive need of 
crops in a way which serves productivity, social equity, or democracy. 
The problem is not deficiency of the individual fanners or DOl personnel. They 
are people of competence and good will who are trying to deal with difficult 
circumstances as best they can. Problems are: 
1. There is no viable water share distributional system worked out which can 
reconcile supply at the headgate with crop demand. Also a viable share system 
will specify the details of operations and maintenance which must be 
accomplished. If it can l>e agreed that a given fraction of available flows at the 
headgate must be distributed to particular points then operations and maintenance 
begins to take on real meaning. Specifically: 
a. There is no compelling connection between payment of water 
L 
43 
44 Irrigation and Drainage in the New Millennium 
management charges and delivery of water at the farm gate. 
b. There is no effective way of making payment contributions 
proportional to water payouts. 
c. The head-tail distinction is re-enforced, not removed. 
2. Without organization of viable rules and tools for operating and 
maintaining functioning water share system, it is impossible to define meaningful 
organizational job roles either for farmer leaders or DOl people. 
3. Expecting cosmopolitan District DOl staff who rotate in and out of the 
irrigation area every few years and who are paid by, and responsible to, authorities 
above them for definitions of good and bad work, who are therefore not 
fundamentally accountable to farmers, all compounds the difficulty caused by the 
lack of an effective water share distribution system. 
a. What exactly should district staff do? Nobody knows because 
there is only a badly broken share system being implemented and that is being 
done as best farmers can. There are no real daily O&M jobs that district staff can 
do. 
b. Given the above it is not surprising that there is no real 
communication or coordination between DOl staff and farmers. 
4. It is, therefore, not surprising that: 
a. Many farmers in the middle and tail reaches are farming in 
virtually dryland conditions and are thereby forgoing increased production of 
higher yielding and more valuable crops. Production, welfare, social equity, and 
the practice of democracy are being unnecessarily sacrificed on this system. 
b. Lack of effective daily O&M means frequent calls for non-routine 
and expensive rehabilitation to be funded by the central treasury. 
c. Farmers are effectively organized to demand expensive and scarce 
capital resources to substitute for their own funds and potentially abundant labor--
farmer resources which will not be delivered by the inadequate organization now 
in phice. Farmer labor and capital will be forthcoming when improved 
organizational arrangements provide assurance that they will result in a real payoff 
meaningful to them--improved water supply and control. 
d. Farmers are not effectively organized to irrigate. Individually they 
are competent and hardworking but collectively are constrained by the lack of 
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properly organized joint agreements about rules and tools constituting an effective 
water share distribution system, recruitment ofleaders and staff, and unworkable 
lines of authority. 
In sum, the Sirsia-Dudhaura irrigation organization reflects a configuration of 
variables and relationships that are unsupportive of effectiveness and democracy 
in the provision of local public goods and/or common property resources. In 
short, it does not work. 
The Bangeri System - An Organizational Success 
This community of irrigators has been functioning for three generations and their 
records established that there are approximately 300 irrigation households which 
work a total of 400 ha., 300 ha. of which are irrigated (See Figure 4). 
Water of the Bangeri river is captured by an earthen barrage about 100 meters 
Figure 4. The Bangeri Irrigation System 
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long and constnlCted by farmers to create a head of water at the inlet of the main 
canal 1 meter deep. The technology employed in this barrage is virtually identical 
to others in this region of Nepal-large stones provide a hard core for the ends of 
the weir while a softer earthen center section will give away to high river flows. • 
This saves the side sections and leaves a bard bund fragment which continues . 
diverting water into the canal during periods ofbigh water. Fanners reported that 
they may have to re-build this barrage as many as 7 times a year. The Deputy 
Chairman reported that fanners were quite capable of mobilizing as much as 
900,000 Rupees (Rs) worth oflabor in a 30 day period. Unfortunately, these 
fanners have the lowest intake on the river due to a combination of low river 
flows during rabi (winter) season and high demand for water by the four farmer 
managed systems above them. This means that the Bangeri main canal generally 
fails to capture a full one meter head of water at the barrage. 
The main canal is 2 Ian. long; total length with secondary canals (Sec Figure 4) is 
6 lan. The command area is divided into 9 zones within each irrigators select a 
leader who represents them on the system Irrigation Committee. The largest farm 
on the system is 10 ha.; the smallest is 0.1 ha. with an average farm size of 1.0 ha. 
The Irrigation Committee (i.e., Board of Directors), composed of the 9 zone 
representatives, elects a Chairman, Deputy Chainnan, a Secretary for record 
keeping, and a Treasurer for fund management and accountability. The Bangeri 
Irrigation Committee operates and maintains a clearly defined and viable water 
share distribution system. This is how it works: 
1. Prior to the beginning of rabi irrigating s0350n each year, the Irrigation 
Committee estimates the total funds required to control water in the system for the 
next year-rabi and kharif. They must fund a variety of items such as barrage 
work. hire a landless laborer for a chowkidar (Rs 7oo/mo. plus 300 kilos ofricelyr 
for night work. plus Rs 30/month for flashlight and batteries), brick, mortar, and 
bank loan payments. Like such systems in many countries, no money is 
appropriated for Irrigation Committee Members who serve voluntarily at no cash 
cost to the system. This year (1992) the Irrigation Committee estimated a total 
need ofRs 28,000 for water management. 
2. The total annual cost includes a loan payment to the Agricultural 
Development Bank in the amount ofRs 20,000. The loan was taken out several 
years ago to finance improvement of a leaky main canal (See Figure 4) by putting 
in a one-sided concrete bank. Also the loan funded purchase of better gates to the 
secondary canals, and 13 culverts where roads crossed canals. The Farmers 
secured technical assistance and support for the loan approval from the District 
Office; although the District Officer had final approval authority, the 
improvements were designed according to farmer wishes and they are satisfied 
with what was done. Given that they were going to be responsible for paying 
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back the cost of improvements, farmers wanted to make each Rupee go as far as 
possible--hence the single sided concrete portion of the main canal as an 
alternative of a two-sided concrete ditch. 
3. The costs of securing water control are then assigned to water shares; 
which are determined by amount ofland to be irrigated, independent of what crop 
is grown. Farmers allocate costs to units called bighas. Since that is a 
complicated computation, I will employ hectares. The farmers agreed that, given 
300 irrigated hectares in the system, and given a total appropriation ofRs 28,000, 
each irrigated hectare would be assessed Rs 93.33. Of this, Rs 30 was payable in 
labor equivalent. 
4. Assessments, due each January, are reviewed and adopted by the Irrigation 
Committee members and then by the general assembly of irrigators. If not paid by 
March, a S% surcharge is levied to the assessment. All funds are deposited in the 
organization's bank account in a nearby town. There is total "transparency" among 
the farmer members. 
S. Since part of the assessment is contributed labor for maintenance, 
irrigators are called out by the Irrigation Committee when needed. If a farmer does 
not wish to work on the job to be done, he or she contributes Rs 30/day to the 
Irrigation Committee which employs a laborer plus a tip of Rs 21day for breakfast. 
6. Costs paid are tightly connected to the delivery of water, and just like a 
bank savings account-no deposit, no withdrawal. When asked ifthere are 
delinquent farmers who wish to get water without paying, the answer was that 
there are always a few. "They come crying, 'my crops are dying, give me water.' 
We give it to them, but they pay." Sometimes in a really serious case, all of the 
farmers are called together in a general assembly of irrigators to put pressure on 
the delinquent--when the social pressure gets intense, the laggard pays the amount 
owed. 
a. Before the first seasonal irrigation, the Irrigation Committee 
inspects the whole command area and make a preliminary assessment of water 
consumptive needs. 
b. The Committee decides priorities of fields and farmers according 
to crop--top priority is given to vegetables, then wheat, oilseeds, maize, etc. 
Sugarcane was one of the lowest priority crops, and viewed as a hedge against 
drought. 
c. Depending on the quantity of river flow, 2-S secondary canals can 
be served with a sufficient head of water. Water is rotated not simply head to tail, 
but modified by: 1) crop consumptive needs; and 2) the Irrigation Committee's 
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best judgement as to how to keep from losing water unnecessarily in wetting dry 
ditch bottoms. 
There is much fine toothed local knowledge that goes into these calculations 
which escaped discussion and my notes. Farmers were agreed that their nwnber. 
one problem is lack of sufficient water at the headgate. If they had a better water 
supply in rabi they would shift from sugarcane, mustard, and lentils to higher 
value vegetable crops. 
Bangeri - An Analvsis 
There are problems in the Bangeri system-- the most notable is insufficient water 
supply, but farmers could also use imprOVed water measurement and control 
structures to help administer their share system. However, these farmers are 
organized to control water in a way that serves productivity within their 
constraints, maintains a rough but effective distributional equity, and embodies 
authentic democratic political control in the community of irrigators. Nobody 
pays for water that is not delivered; nobody takes water without contributing an 
approximate "fair share" to the cost of managing it. The share system succeeds in 
uniting cost and benefit, but it struggles with the head-tail problems which, while 
not eliminated, are kept within acceptable bounds. No matter where the irrigator 
is positioned in the queue, slhe can be confident that by fulfilling their 
organizational obligation, by paying their share assessment, they will receive an 
acceptable water delivery dividend. 
The management authority administering the water share distributional system is 
composed of local people having detailed local knowledge who are accountable to 
the irrigation community. DOl personnel make no pretense of involving 
themselves in the daily operation and maintenance of the share system. They are 
kept in their proper place--providers oftechnical assistance in the design of 
improvements and in obtaining outside financial help. 
Bangeri represents an effective and democratically responsive irrigation 
organization, rather than being more fitted for lobbying the central bureaucracy for 
resources than for the work of irrigation and agricultural production as is the case 
in Sursia-Dudhaura. The farmers at Bangeri are empowered to control water. 
Their organization provides them with a vehicle for productivity, equity, and the 
daily practice oflocal democracy. 
CONCLUSION 
Why do some local organizations earn the support and loyalty oftheir 
memberships, successfully empower people within democratic frameworks to 
Organizational Requisites 
provide themselves with essentials oflocal infrastructure, and provide crucial 
linkages between central government bureaucracies and local people? Why do 
others fail in these tasks? 
In sum, the argument here has contended that the difference lies in the 
configuration of a few strategic variables. Small changes make for large 
differences in organizational outcomes. The critical variables have to do with 
recruitment of leaders and staff (local/cosmopolitan), configuration of 
responsibility (are citizen-leaders accountable to the agendas of authorities above 
or to irrigators below?), and the design of the resource share distribution system in 
a way which unites delivery of the organizational benefit stream to member 
fulfillment of obligation and delivery quality service without respect to position in 
the service queue. 
Likewise, irrigation system rehabilitation is not simply a technical matter of 
interest to those who design and construct physical works; it is most importantly a 
process which must address those social organizational considerations that all too 
often account for degradation of the physical works in the first instance. 
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